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One of the important characteristics of the Brazilian Model of
Telecommunications Reform (BMTR) was the adoption of a duopo-
ly policy, constraining the entry of new players in the wire segment
in the transitional phase until free competition in 2002. This pol-
icy was also used in the reform experience of the United Kingdom
in telecommunications in the 80´s. The theoretical explanations
behind this kind of policy are not strong enough to justify the
duopoly policy in telecommunications. The most plausible idea
rests on the prominent role conferred to privatization revenues in
the design of the reform as a means of helping the eﬀorts to con-
solidate price stabilization in the country. We introduce a model
with the trade-oﬀs between competition, duplication of ﬁxed costs
and privatization revenues. Despite the importance of ﬁxed costs
in the objective function of the regulator, we show that the privati-
zation revenue target is the aspect, which justiﬁes the imposition of
entry constraints. The British experience shows that the sacriﬁce
of this kind of policy regarding eﬃciency in the long run can be
substantial.
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Uma das caracter´ısticas mais importantes do Modelo Brasileiro de
Reforma das Telecomunicac¸o˜es foi a adoc¸a˜o de uma pol´ıtica de
duopo´lio, restringindo a entrada de novas empresas no segmento de
telefonia ﬁxa durante a fase de transic¸a˜o ate´ a livre concorreˆncia
a ser adotada a partir de 2002. Essa pol´ıtica foi tambe´m utilizada
na experieˆncia de reforma das telecomunicac¸o˜es ocorrida no Reino
Unido na de´cada de 80. As explicac¸o˜es teo´ricas para justiﬁcar
a adoc¸a˜o deste tipo de pol´ıtica na˜o sa˜o satisfato´rias o suﬁciente
para justiﬁcar a pol´ıtica de duopo´lio como prescric¸a˜o de pol´ıtica
nas telecomunicac¸o˜es. A ide´ia mais plaus´ıvel se baseia no papel
proeminente conferido a`s receitas de privatizac¸a˜o no desenho da
reforma como forma de auxiliar os esforc¸os de consolidac¸a˜o da es-
tabilizac¸a˜o de prec¸os no Pa´ıs. Introduzimos um modelo que apre-
senta os trade-oﬀs entre concorreˆncia, duplicac¸a˜o de custos ﬁxos
e receitas de privatizac¸a˜o. A despeito da importaˆncia dos custos
ﬁxos na func¸a˜o objetivo do regulador, mostramos que a meta de au-
mentar as receitas esperadas de privatizac¸a˜o e´ o aspecto que acaba
por justiﬁcar a imposic¸a˜o das restric¸o˜es de entrada. A experieˆncia
britaˆnica mostra que o sacrif´ıcio deste tipo de pol´ıtica no que tange
a` eﬁcieˆncia no longo prazo pode ser substantiva.
1. Introduction
In this article, our goal is to address the substantive motivations for intro-
ducing entry constraints and their impact on eﬃciency in the Brazilian Model of
Telecommunications Reform (BMTR).
The ﬁrst motivation for entry constraints in telecom is the allocation of the
spectrum, a scarce resource, regarding wireless segments. However, we shall ab-
stain from discussing spectrum allocation.1 Our interest is concentrated on the
rationale for a temporary duopoly policy designed to the BMTR in the wire seg-
ment, presented in the next section, which resembles the policy adopted after
privatization in 1984 in the UK.
There are at least four theoretical arguments in favor of limiting entry as
discussed in section 3. They are the non-sustainability of a natural monopoly, the
imposition of universal service constraints requiring cross-subsidy between lines
of business, the business stealing eﬀect when there are scale economy as in the
classical paper of Mankiw and Whinston and the possibility of under-investment
of the operators when there is competition. But we are of the opinion that the
main motivation for the behavior of the regulator in imposing entry constraints in
1A survey on the issue of spectrum allocation can be found in Cramton (2002).
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the BMTR relates to the trade-oﬀ between the introduction of competition, scale
economies and privatization revenues. That was the case of Brazil.
On one hand, more entry increases the overall ﬁxed costs of the sector, this
reducing the total social surplus. Moreover, the expectation of more entry makes
the state-owned companies about to be privatized less proﬁtable. This makes the
“object” of the privatization auction less valuable for bidders that respond by bid-
ding less aggressively. This reduces the winner bid equilibrium of the privatization
auction, dropping privatization revenues. Given that most regulators around the
world, including Brazil, have a special concern over the “ﬁscal role” of the priva-
tization, this by-product is not welcome. On the other hand, more entry increases
competition that reduces market power, increasing the total social surplus net of
ﬁxed costs.
Even considering competition in telecommunications as the core of the reform,
Brazilian regulators have been concerned about privatization revenues that would
contribute to the ongoing stabilization plan and as a measure of the success of the
program. Indeed, Law 8031 of 1990 that launched privatization policy in Brazil
quoted explicitly “privatization revenues” as one of the main goals of the program.
Another relevant set of theoretical considerations that might be considered has
a more dynamic nature. It is commonly accepted that the lack of external threat
towards the inside market players weakens the competition between them. The
incentive for collusive behavior increases with a smaller number of players, not
only because of the greater diﬃculty of the enforcement of an agreement, but as
shown by Selten (1973), presented by Phlips (1995:2), as a Nash perfect sub-game
equilibrium of the market game. In this author’s interesting particular example,
the existence of four players results in a cooperative cartel equilibrium (that does
not require communication), while more than ﬁve players results in at least one
maverick ﬁrm free-riding on the cartel and beneﬁting consumers.
A very important dynamic relationship is the one between competition and
innovation. Since Schumpeter, there has been a lot of work on this issue. On one
hand, that author has stressed that this could be a negative relationship, since
competition would dissipate the rents from innovations, reducing the incentive to
search for technological improvements. On the other hand, more rivals may stim-
ulate more eﬀorts from the market players to be the ﬁrst to obtain a new product
and/or process. The net eﬀect of more competition on the incentive to innovate is
ambiguous, though, as shown by Viscusi et al. (1995:89-93).2 Economists today
2The statement that the authors reproduce (p. 92) from Scherer and Ross (1982) is informa-
tive about their position on this trade-oﬀ: “what is needed for rapid technical progress is a subtle
blend of competition and monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the former than the latter,
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tend to think that this relationship is even more complicated, being market con-
centration, the degree of competition3 and the incentive to innovate, endogenous
variables aﬀecting one another in diﬀerent ways, depending on the speciﬁc sectors
within which they are inserted.4
In sections 3 and 4, we leave dynamics aside and focus on static considera-
tions, though we quote some dynamic arguments as raised by British economists
assessing the UK experience with the duopoly policy in telecommunications. In
section 4, we formalize the main issue of this paper, that is, the imposition of entry
constraints in the BMTR. We focus on the short-run static trade-oﬀ between pri-
vatization revenues that increases when the number of competitors shrinks and the
total social surplus (including ﬁxed costs) that holds an ambiguous relationship
with the number of competitors. On one hand, more competitors reduce prices,
increasing net welfare. On the other hand, more competitors increase wasteful
ﬁxed costs, dropping welfare. An important ﬁnding is that, since market forces
naturally constrain the number of players, the exogenous entry constraint may be
redundant, even if one considers the target of privatization revenues. Only when
this goal is strong enough relative to the total social surplus in the regulator’s
objective function, it will make sense to impose an exogenous entry constraint.
That seems to be the case.
Section 5 summarizes the duopoly policy in the UK, as described by Vickers
and Yarrow (1988) and Armstrong et al. (1994), and concludes.
2. The Duopoly Policy in the BMTR
After restructuring and privatising the Brazilian state-owned holding, TELE-
BRAS, the Brazilian government started on another important step in the reform
towards a more liberalised telecommunications sector, auctioning new grants to
entrants.
The system designed was closely related to the temporary duopoly model of the
UK.5 Each privatized wire company, local and long distance (EMBRATEL) would
face only one competitor with a grant to explore the same telephone service in the
same geographic area until December 2001, when controls of entry were lifted. All
and the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological opportunities exist”.
3Note that less concentration and competition do not always go in the same direction in these
models.
4Reinganum (1989) provides a survey of models describing the web of possible interactions.
Nelson and Winter (1982) stress on the “Darwinian” role of competition. Sutton (1998) advances
a rich new framework of this relationship based on the “bounds approach”.
5See Armstrong et al. (1994:7), Armstrong (1998) and Cave and Williansom (1996).
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new grants were also conceded after a public auction.6 The new companies that
emerged from this process in the BMTR were called “mirror companies”.
The entrants in the wire segment could operate exactly in the same areas as
the incumbent privatized regional companies and had the same cross-ownership
constraints in the short-run. For instance, the mirror company in region I could
operate all local services in that region and all intra-area long distance services in
that same region, but not inter-area services, just like with the constraints imposed
on the privatized regional company. The same constraints hold for the other two
regional mirror companies.7
In the case of the mirror company of the long distance carrier EMBRATEL,
INTELIG, the scope of operation is the same as EMBRATEL’s, being able to
make long distance calls (inter and intra areas) but not in the local service. There
is overlapping competition of EMBRATEL’s mirror company only with the incum-
bent and mirror regional companies in the intra-area long distance service. Hence,
there are four companies competing in the intra-region long distance service and
only two in the other services (local and inter-area).
This is one striking diﬀerence between the BMTR and the UK model, where
the duopolists were nation-wide operators. We summarize the diﬀerences among
Brazil, the US and the UK below:
6This is an important and superior departure of the BMTR from the UK, since an auction
is always a better mechanism to get more eﬃcient operators compared with the “ﬁrst claimant
rule” that appointed Mercury as the second duopolist in the British experience. See Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) for the theoretical comparison between auctions and negotiations.
7See Herrera (1998), Pires (1999) and Mattos (2001) for a more detailed explanation about
the general rules of the BMTR.
RBE Rio de Janeiro 58(3):403-428 JUL/SET 2004










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RBE Rio de Janeiro 58(3):403-428 JUL/SET 2004
The Duopoly Policy in the Brazilian Model of Telecommunications Reform 409
In the case of the wire telephone system, diﬀerently from the mobile one, the
auctions for new grants occurred only after the privatization of the incumbent
companies in TELEBRAS.8 According to the “General Guidelines to the Opening
of the Telecommunications Sector in Brazil”(1997-GGTB),9 the main reason for
this timing was the need to grant the incumbents enough time to prepare them-
selves for full-ﬂedged competition, without constraints imposed on them, being
state-owned companies.
Similarly to the British experience, the BMTR limited entry to two compa-
nies in a ﬁrst moment, providing for a gradual liberalization afterwards until the
achievement of a fully liberalised market. Figure 1 below shows the overall entry
liberalization phasing out schedule in telecommunications in Brazil.
Figure 1
Schedule of the BMTR entry policy























Second wave of wireless entrants
Possibility of anticipation of the
entry schedule for the incumbents
and the mirror companies
According to ﬁgure 1, there are four important deadlines in the BMTR entry
schedule in the wire segment. First, there is a “second wave” of new entrants, en-
tering without auctions or any other rationing rule after 2002. This second wave is
completely free of entry constraints. After 2003, the ﬁrst wave of entrants, owners
8In the case of the mobile companies, the auctions for the mirror-companies occurred before
the privatization of the eight mobile companies owned by TELEBRAS, and it seems to have
provided a good chance of growth to the entrants, as revealed by the current market-shares of the
mobile mirror companies in some areas. See Novaes (2000) for an analysis of the ﬁrst concessions
of mobile services before privatization and its role in improving the experience of the regulator
for selling TELEBRAS assets in the future.
9This document was used by the government as the general explanation introducing the bill
of telecommunications reform to Congress after the Constitutional amendment that allowed for
private ownership in this sector.
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of the mirror companies, got free of any constraints, too. Notice that this date can
be anticipated to 2002, if they fulﬁll commitments of service supply established in
their licenses.10 After 2004, there will be no entry or line of business constraints
for all players with the liberalization of entry in other areas by the owners of the
privatized companies. Also in this case, this schedule can be anticipated to 2002
with the anticipation of the universal targets fulﬁllment.
It is curious that the GGTB had argued so vigorously against entry constraints;
nonetheless, the government adopted this policy afterwards. According to the
GGTB, the risks of facilitated collusive behavior due to the duopoly policy would
clearly oﬀset some apparent advantages.11
3. Revisiting the Main Theoretical Arguments in Favor of Limiting
Entry
There are simple explanations frequently oﬀered by the regulatory authori-
ties worldwide to justify policies of constraining entry. According to Armstrong
(2000:2), “The argument usually given for temporary monopoly is that incumbents
somehow require a “transitional” period to prepare for full-blown competition. The
evidence is that a more eﬀective way for ineﬃcient incumbents to become compet-
itive is actually to face competition. A more cynical explanation for such policies
is that they are part of the “privatization contract”, i.e. a kind of bribe paid to the
incumbent (including both the employers and employees) to persuade it to support
the privatization process”.
In this section, we address arguments behind the imposition of entry limits, well
grounded on the economic theory, assessing their relevance for telecommunications.
10These commitments were part of the auction bid for the license to be a mirror company.
11The collusive risk of the duopoly policy was stated in the following terms: “The investment
in parallel infrastructure and price competition reduces the business value for both duopolists and,
therefore, their most probable behavior will be a kind of tacit agreement that avoids or reduces
these problems. The most likely result will be the consolidation of monopolies in well-deﬁned areas,
with some competition in the boundaries of those areas and for the most proﬁtable users.....The
non-limitation of the quantity of new operators, connected with the imposition of duties to the
old operators, in terms of investment in new infrastructure, along the required time for the con-
solidation of an eﬀectively competitive market, can eliminate most of the problems pointed out
in the duopoly case........The non-existence of a rigid duopolistic structure makes collusive agree-
ments among operators toward the geographical division of the market harder, because there will
always be a new company eager to invest in order to meet a non-fulﬁlled demand. Therefore, it’s
clear that the scenario where there were no limits to the quantity of operators seems to be better
than those that impose such constraints; hence, scenarios with duopoly structures would not be
recommended”.
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Natural Monopoly and Non-Sustainability
The most important argument used by regulators in the past to justify regula-
tory entry restrictions in telecommunications is the conventional “natural mono-
poly” theory. A market is a “natural monopoly” if the cost function is sub-
additive.12 The rationale behind introducing entry constraints is to guarantee that,
if it is more eﬃcient to produce with a single monopolist supplier in the context of
a sub-additive cost function, there will be no further entry to disturb an eﬃcient
result. The concern is the occurrence of a “non-sustainable natural monopoly”
where, despite the eﬃciency of a single ﬁrm supply given by the natural monopoly
condition, the market may not naturally achieve an actual monopoly.13,14 In that
case, there could be proﬁtable entry, “cream-skimming” the market in an ineﬃ-
cient manner. The same rationale is directly extended to the cases of a “natural
duopoly” when the most eﬃcient number of ﬁrms in the market is two, or even
other positive integers.
This view can be challenged on the following grounds. First, it is not clear
which segments of telecommunications remain natural monopolies, mainly in the
long distance.15 Second, the risk of a non-sustainable natural monopoly (or
duopoly and so on) is more decisive in the context of a contestable market like
that described by Baumol et al. (1982), and this is not a suitable hypothesis for
telecommunications.
Furthermore, a non-sustainable monopoly or duopoly depend on the existence
of scale and/or scope economies followed by scale and/or scope diseconomies in
the relevant range of operation. There is no systematic evidence, however, in fa-
vor of the scale economies hypothesis in the telecommunications sector and even
less evidence showing diseconomies of scale in this sector.16 In that case, being
12According to Tirole (1988:19), the general multi-product mathematical deﬁnition of a strictly






C(qi) for any n-tuple of outputs q1, .......qn.
13See Viscusi et al. (1995:357).
14Note that the idea behind sustainability is not only linked to natural monopoly but to any
monopoly. According to Spulber (1989:138), “a sustainable monopoly price refers to a market-
clearing price vector in such a way that the monopolist is able to break even and additional entry
is unproﬁtable”.
15The history of the intercity US telecommunications market provides an illustration of a pro-
gressive weakening of the natural monopoly argument, as can be seen in Viscusi et al. (1995:487).
16See the early evidence in the survey by Fuss (1983) and in the updating of Waverman
(1989:83-95). This latter author concludes that “the weight of the evidence in all these studies is
simply not strong enough, since changing the level of aggregation, the functional form, the con-
straints imposed, or the objective function dramatically alters the results. The message is simply
that the data available are insuﬃcient to enable researchers to discriminate between alternative
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sustainable, the natural monopoly will also be a de facto monopoly if the reg-
ulator lets the market work. Hence, the constraint becomes meaningless17 and,
consequently, imposing entry constraints in telecommunications on the basis of
the natural monopoly hypothesis does not seem reasonable. Vickers and Yarrow
(1988) reinforce these critiques in the context of the UK duopoly policy, pointing at
three weaknesses of the argument: it cannot be taken for granted that cost condi-
tions are naturally monopolistic with today’s technology; even if natural monopoly
conditions do in fact exist and actual entry does not occur, it still has desirable
incentive eﬀects on the incumbents’ behavior and; free entry undermines collusion
among incumbents.
Universal Service and Non-Sustainability
Non-sustainability can also occur through the imposition of universal service
duties in diﬀerent areas that imply cross-subsidization. This is particularly impor-
tant for Brazil since the geographic extent of the country and the profound regional
and social diﬀerences explain the relatively more important role performed by the
universal service target in Brazil than in other more developed countries. Fur-
thermore, besides the need to avoid increased regional imbalances, there was the
need to guarantee political support for the privatization program in the country.
Given the relatively high political signiﬁcance of the less developed regions,18 a
perceived lack of federal government commitment to the universal service target
could dampen the political support for privatization. As we will see now, the
funding of universal service and the theory behind non-sustainability are strongly
linked. Armstrong et al. (1994) state that the issue of non-sustainability is more
hypotheses.................... My view is that the sub-additive test for aggregate AT&T data is so
sensitive to data and to econometric technique that it cannot be relied upon for making policy”.
Waverman (1989:94) guesses that, given the huge size of AT&T, scale and scope economies be-
tween 1947/77 were unlikely. Shin and Ying (1992) aimed to circumvent methodological problems
from the earlier studies, concluding for the non-existence (at a regional level) of scale economies
in telecommunications. More contemporaneously, see also the survey of Fuss and Waverman
(2002). Interestingly, the same debate about the existence of scale and scope economies in the
wire sector is occurring in the mobile sector. While McKenzie and Small (1997) found that scale
economies exist in the US mobile segment only up to a small range of subscribers, Foreman and
Beauvais (1999), criticising the small sample exercise performed by the former, found signiﬁcant
scale economies for the GTE mobile company.
17The main criticism by Armstrong et al. (1994:106) about the practical possibility of non-
sustainability is that it requires the strong hypothesis behind the conventional “contestable mar-
kets” theory.
18See Serra (1995, chapter 3).
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likely to occur as a consequence of distortions brought about by the regulatory
framework, such as requirements of free supply or constraints on pricing structure.
Viscusi et al. (1995:484-486) provide a simple graphic example with two goods
with regulated prices and a break-even constraint that results in cream-skimming
and ineﬃcient entry. The hypothesis that leads to this result is the existence of
cross-subsidization where one tariﬀ is ﬁxed at a price above its stand-alone aver-
age cost (AC) and average incremental costs (AIC) and the other is ﬁxed below
both.19
We reproduce the graphs of Viscusi et al. (1995:486) below in ﬁgure 2 and
assume that the regulator deﬁnes the “universal service” target as a minimum
quantity just like in the BMTR. For example, the regulator imposes the minimum
quantity of local service (or in a given area) as “Y ”, given by Qy0 on the right
hand graph in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2






  Qx0  Qx    Qy0 Qy
Clearly, universal service involves negative proﬁts in market Y , given the price
that the ﬁrm has to charge to generate that demand and given the stand-alone
average cost (AC) and the average incremental cost (AIC) curves of providing this
service jointly with the long distance service X. Assuming that the ﬁrm must
break-even to continue its operation, the regulator has to allow for positive proﬁts
in the long distance market X that cover the damages in market Y . Assume that
Pxo and Qxo on the left hand side in ﬁgure 2 are such that:
Px0Qx0 + Py0Qy0 − C(Qx0, Qy0) = 0 (1)
Note that the equilibrium point on the demand curve in market X is above the
respective incremental average cost curve (AIC(Qx)) implying a positive proﬁt in
market X.
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In this conﬁguration, cream-skimming or the incentive for an entrant to enter
the most proﬁtable service X (the cream), leaving the non-proﬁtable one, Y ,
unattended (the milk), is very likely. An entrant can ﬁx a price in X, Pxe, slightly
lower than Pxo but still superior to the stand-alone average cost of producing X,
AC(Qx), stealing all the proﬁtable market. In that case, the universal service in
the local service (or area) Y has to be funded by external sources, which is not a
desirable result for the regulator. Therefore, the regulator has an incentive to block
entry in X to avoid cream-skimming and to make universal service a feasible task
without providing external sources for its funding. Note that cream-skimming in
this example comes from tariﬀ regulation that implies a cross-subsidization scheme
imposed by the government and not from the classical explanation based on the
market forces indicated above.
On the other hand, even if one takes for granted that universal service targeting
is crucial, the minimum quantities scheme described is not the best policy response.
Indeed, as Armstrong (2000) stresses, the imposition of a barrier to entry is not the
best way to handle this problem and alternatives like a “universal service fund”20
and auctions for the subsidies are more interesting, which undermines the “non-
sustainability through universal service” argument that favors entry constraints.
Business Stealing Eﬀect
Another theoretical rationale for imposing institutional barriers to entry orig-
inates from the “business stealing eﬀect”. Several authors have shown how this
eﬀect occurs. Von Weizsaker (1980) built a model where scale economies brought
on the possibility that the equilibrium number of companies could be excessive.
Perry (1984) proposed a more general setting with scale economies and showed
that, within a very large range of conjectural variation models, the “excess entry
result” can appear. The most known contribution comes from Mankiw and Whin-
ston (1986). They show that the negative marginal externality of additional entry
on the incumbents more than oﬀsets the gain of consumers from more competi-
tion.21,22
20This kind of fund is being implemented in Brazil.
21While those papers study free market equilibrium, Harris (1981) and Suzumura and Kiyono
(1987) examine the problem under price and entry regulation. See also Seade (1980) and Berry
and Waldfogel (1999) for an empirical evaluation of those losses in the radiobroadcasting segment.
22There are several instances where the entrants do not take into account some negative
externality over the incumbents and this can decrease welfare. Stiglitz (1981), for example, argues
that this is the case of the relationship between competition and the conventional “excessive R&D
expenditures result” and when there are important learning-by-doing eﬀects that increase with
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Armstrong et al. (1994:106-107) assesses the “business-stealing” problem in
a non-formalized way, aiming at analysing its usefulness as a guideline for policy
prescription in the case of the privatization of British Telecom in the UK.23 The
authors (1994:108-109) ask if a corollary of this result would be that the imposition
of constraints on the number of entrants would be better than full liberalization.
The authors’ answer is a big NO since: more weight can be given to consumers in
the welfare criterion; the beneﬁt to the consumer implied by product diﬀerentia-
tion may overturn the result; entry constraints may stimulate collusive behavior;
asymmetric information tends to make free market preferable to a benign regula-
tor; entry constraint eliminates the Darwinian property of competition that selects
the most eﬃcient ﬁrms; it is not plausible to assume, in telecommunications, that
“entrants instantly became full-sized replicas of incumbents, with no need to build
capital over time”.
Furthermore, returning to the paper by Mankiw (1986:56), we have the result
that the welfare loss due to free entry diminishes as the ﬁxed costs required to
enter decrease. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that in the technological
history of this sector, the ﬁxed costs requirements have been decreasing, including
the advent of ﬁbre-optics. Thus, we can also state that the eventual loss of welfare
due to the “excess entry result” in telecommunications tends to be much lower
than in the past.
Under-Investment
Armstrong and Vickers (1996) evaluate the trade-oﬀs involved in allowing free-
entry in telecommunications immediately compared to a phasing-in scheme that
postpones full liberalization, in the transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe. The authors assume that the main concern about telecommunications and
infrastructure in these countries relates to a tendency towards under-investment,
given the lack of credibility of the regulatory institutions. The authors also stress
the risk of wasteful duplication of facilities causing costly delay of investments in
the case of a free-entry policy. Duplication would be particularly costly in transi-
tion economies because the low level of demand indicates that natural monopoly
conditions are still prevalent.24 While the previous three arguments were discussed
the quantity per ﬁrm. See also Propositions 4, 5 and 7 of Reinganum (1989:857).
23According to the authors, “where scale economies are present, there is a trade-oﬀ - more
competition is likely to improve allocative eﬃciency but at the expense of some productive eﬃ-
ciency”.
24In this context, there is a “wait and see” behavior, given the existence of information
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theoretically, the relevance of the “under-investment” eﬀect requires a discussion
based on the relevance of these concerns for the Brazilian economy and the BMTR.
As we emphasized in the introduction, the Brazilian government implemented
a regulatory framework that was more comprehensive, credible and transparent
to private agents than other similar experiences. Most of the implementation
of the BMTR happened between 1995 (the constitutional amendment) and 1998
(privatization of the wire companies), a period during which the credibility of the
market reforms in Brazil was largely sustained by the successful stabilization of
inﬂation through the Real Plan in 1994. Moreover, the same Finance Minister who
was elected President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, undertook the stabilization
plan for 1995/1998. One of the great virtues of the Brazilian stabilization plan
was that no contracts were broken and all market rules were kept intact in contrast
with previous plans. In this regard, the credibility obtained with the stabilization
plan favored the credibility of the pro-market reforms.
Even in periods of strong state intervention in the country, the presence of
transnational companies in the Brazilian economy was substantive. Foreign busi-
ness was already well rooted in Brazil. Hence, the BMTR did not suﬀer from
the same historical credibility problems of the ex-communist countries. The speed
of reforms in Brazil was not as important as in the former communist countries,
where even the introduction of a market system could not be taken for granted.
The increased investment in the Brazilian telecommunication infrastructure
was signiﬁcant, but the gap between supply and demand was not as great as in
the former communist countries. A more eﬃcient telecommunications sector is
more important in Brazil than an increase in investment “at any cost”.
Given the general perception of the telecommunications market excellent pros-
pects in Brazil, the “wait and see” hypothesis does not seem applicable to Brazil.
The risk of expropriation in Brazil does not look greater than in developed coun-
tries.25 The Brazilian population, territory and economy are big enough to suggest
that the long distance service is not a natural monopoly in the country.
Therefore, the conditions of the Brazilian economy do not resemble the ones
existent in the former communist countries. In any case, the arguments in favor
of a phasing-in of the entry constraints in the former communist countries are not
as strong as the arguments favoring immediate competition after (or even before)
externalities.
25In the UK, for instance, the price cap X values established for the power sector were reviewed
in 1995, before the previously established date to do so. This was very criticized by economists,
given its negative impact on the credibility of this price cap system and, thus, on the incentives
for eﬃciency that it should provide. See Newbery (2000).
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privatization.26 The important issues to consider in the Brazilian case are more
related to the developed countries’ experience than to the former communist coun-
tries’. In the next section, we assess the trade-oﬀ between privatization revenues,
scale economies and competition after privatization.
4. A Theoretical Model for Understanding the Trade-oﬀs among
Competition, Scale Economies and privatization Revenues
In every privatization program around the world, one of the most important
targets has been the generation of public revenues through the sale of the com-
panies. In countries with deep ﬁscal imbalances, or in a period of price stabiliza-
tion like in Brazil and Argentina, the “public revenue” target becomes even more
prominent.
The fundamentals of the Brazilian 1994 stabilization program could not be
taken for granted by 1998 and the privatization policy performed an important
macroeconomic role. When they reformed their telecommunications, the UK and
US governments were not pressed by the same macroeconomic constraints as in
Brazil. Nevertheless, the privatization revenues were relatively less important in
Brazil than they were in other countries that proceeded with the privatization
program as a major part of the stabilization plan or even with the overall re-
form program as in Argentina’s case.27 In those cases, the relative weight of the
macroeconomic purpose in the privatization program was even more prominent.
In addition, it is important to note that, in Brazil, the amount of revenues
raised through the privatization program was taken as one of the main indicators
of the success of the policy. The higher the expected market power of the company
after privatization, the higher its expected future proﬁts, the higher the expected
bids in the privatization auction and, likewise, the higher the public revenues to
be raised. The revenues obtained in the program are an objective and immediate
result to be shown to the public.
Some formalization generates further insights for the intuitive rationale behind
26Note the Armstrong and Vickers’ conclusion (1996:313) in favor of a policy of short-run
entry constraints in the wire segment for the former communist countries is much less than
“enthusiastic”: “These considerations have led us to the conclusion that a reasonable case can be
made – we put it no stronger – for phased rather than immediate liberalization in basic ﬁxed-link
telephony, provided that there is ex-ante competition for any time-limited monopoly concession,
that its duration is short, that explicit investment requirements are agreed on in return for the
concession, and that there are eﬀective safeguards against monopolistic abuse in interim”.
27See Abdala and Hill (1996).
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the trade-oﬀs involved in a privatization program. We build a model that shows the
trade-oﬀs among competition, privatization revenues and scale economies, since all
infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications tend to present non-negligible
ﬁxed costs.
We take as given the format of the auction as a ﬁrst-sealed bid auction, as
was partially the case of the BMTR, and follow the basic framework developed by
Klemperer (2000). The author assumes n bidders with independent private values.
Each bidder i has values Vi over the object (the company) to be sold, indepen-
dently drawn from the same continuous distribution function G(V ) on the interval[
V , V
)
with density g(V ). Bidders do not know each other’s types, but only the
distribution G(.) from which those types are drawn. This distribution function is
supposedly uniform. The seller (government) also knows this distribution. The
minimum price that the seller deﬁnes for the sale of the company is V . Klemperer
(2000) shows that the expected revenue, ER, of the seller is




V − V ) (2)
Next, we pass to an analysis of the market conditions after privatization and
its expected impact on the privatization revenues and the general maximization
problem of the government. We pick a Cournot oligopoly model with m players
provided by Tirole (1988:220), introducing a ﬁxed cost Fi speciﬁc to each player.
Suppose the following linear demand function and the m symmetric individual
cost curves:
P (Q) = 1−Q (3)
Ci(qi) = cqi + Fi fori = 1 . . .m (4)





The equilibrium proﬁt, quantity and price values are derived from the ﬁrst-
order condition.
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The total ﬂow of proﬁts equals the type Vi of the ﬁrm. As the ﬁrst part
of the proﬁt function is constant across all ﬁrms for a given number of players
m, the diﬀerence will be given by the ﬁxed cost Fi. This is supposed to be the
required ﬁxed cost for each player type to supply any quantity at the constant
marginal cost c in each period. The higher Fi, the closer Vi will be to the least
eﬃcient type V . The maximum and minimum values of the ﬁxed cost found in the
distribution function G(V ) are given, without loss of generality, by Fh (F high)














Replacing (8) and (9) in (2), we reach the expected revenue of the government

















− Fh + (n− 1)(n + 1)Fh







When the government only cares about privatization revenues, it always mini-
mizes the number of players to be allowed in the market as much as possible. The
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expected revenue of the privatization auction is always decreasing in the number
of players allowed to enter, and then it makes sense to constrain the number of
players ex ante to achieve a higher amount of privatization revenues. The intu-
ition is very straight: The greater the ex-post number of players in the market,
the lower the market power rents to be appropriated and thus the lower the value
of the company for any player, reducing expected revenue.
Now, we incorporate the standard measure of social welfare W (Q). Social

































Replacing the equilibrium quantity from (6) in (13), we obtain:


















This is the total surplus as a function of the marginal cost c, the number of
ﬁrms m operating in the market in a Cournot equilibrium and the sum of the
expected ﬁxed costs of all these m ﬁrms. Given that G. is a uniform distribution,
so is the distribution of the ﬁxed costs that we deﬁne as H(.). Furthermore, we
suppose that entry occurs by order of eﬃciency and all players that aim to enter
are among the n bidders of the privatization auction. The expected m players to
enter are always the most eﬃcient ones. The expectation of the ﬁxed cost of the
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The government weights total surplus from (14) by 1 − α and privatization
revenues from (10) by α in its (assumed utility separable) objective function:
G = αER + (1− α)EW (16)
Furthermore, it does not make sense to have m < 1. So, we add the constraint




− Fh + (n− 1)(n + 1)Fh + (1− α)








We want to obtain the value of m for which G is maximum, considering the






− (1− α)(2m + 1)Fh
2(n + 1)
(17)
We have that if α > 1/3, ∂G/∂m < 0 everywhere and thus the constraint binds
(m∗ = 1). In this case, privatization revenues are important enough so that the
objective function of the government always decreases with the number of players
in the market. The lower α, the weight of privatization revenues reduces, pushing
the optimal number of ﬁrms m∗ upwards.29
The lower Fh, there is less expected ﬁxed cost when new players enter the
market, which makes competition relatively more desirable. Finally, the greater
28For any random variable, X, uniform in the interval [a, b], with density function fX and
distribution function FX , the density of the statistics of order k(Yk) in a sample of n values will




yfk(y)dy and integrating by parts, we get the formula.
29Of course, depending on the functional form of the government’s objective, the range of α
for which ∂G/∂m < 0, will vary.
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the value of c for α < 1/3, the lower the optimal number of ﬁrms. This occurs
since, with a higher c, there will be less variable proﬁt available to cover the ﬁxed
costs. We comment below on the case where α > 1/3.
An interesting aspect of (17) is that if it is negative for any m = mj , it will
also be negative for m = mj + 1,mj + 2 . . . . . .∞. Note also that the introduction
of privatization revenues in the problem just makes the optimal number of ﬁrms
lower than otherwise. There would still be a ﬁnite optimal number of companies
without it, given that the regulator also cares about minimizing ﬁxed costs.
But nothing guarantees that the expected feasible number of ﬁrms in the mar-
ket, mf , is higher than the optimal m∗ from (17), which would make the entry
constraint a relevant one. Formally, we deﬁne mf as the maximum integer value
of m such that
(1− c)2
(mf + 1)2




− (2mf + 1)Fh
2(n + 1)
≥ 0 (18)
mf is the expected maximal number of ﬁrms that will voluntarily enter in a
Cournot equilibrium. The eﬀective number of ﬁrms me in the market, with entry
regulation ruled by (17), will be
me = Min(mf ,m∗) (19)
If me = mf , the institutional constraint imposed by the regulator is meaning-
less since the market itself will lead the number of ﬁrms as close as possible to
the optimal. On the other hand, if me = m∗, the imposition of the constraint is
binding and thus required to achieve the objective function of the regulator.
It is important to compare the inﬂuence of the exogenous variables of the model
in mf and m∗. The greater Fh, the lower will m∗ and mf be. It is straightforward
since larger ﬁxed costs increase the social cost of entry (reducing m∗) and also the
net proﬁt of the competitors, reducing the stimulus for entry. Similarly, the larger
the number of potential entrants n, the larger the values of m∗ and mf , since the
expected ﬁxed cost of the entrants also decreases.
An increase on c always reduces mf . On the other hand, c brings ambiguous
eﬀects over m∗. An increase on c impacts the derivative of the regulator’s ob-
jective function in respect to the social surplus and to the expected privatization
revenues of the government. The net eﬀect depends crucially on α. The higher
this parameter, it becomes more likely that the second eﬀect will be stronger and
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then m∗ will decrease. α also impacts m∗ directly (and not only indirectly through
c).
The comparison of (17) to (18) shows that if α > 1/3, the regulatory entry con-
straint will just be redundant when mf = 1. If mf > 1, the entry constraint binds.
When α < 1/3, we can address the redundancy of the constraint by assessing the
diﬀerence between (17) and (18) at mf :






If this diﬀerence is positive, m∗ ≥ mf and the imposition of the constraint is
redundant, since the market itself will deﬁne a ceiling in the number of entrants
lower or equal to the optimal number of players for the regulator. If this diﬀerence
is negative and large enough,30 the entry constraint starts to bind. The larger Fh,
the more likely the entry constraint will not be active, since the ﬁrms care more
about its impact on proﬁts than the regulator cares about its impact on social
welfare (according to (17), the regulator discounts Fh by (1−α). Variations on α
bring ambiguous results on (20) and the magnitudes of c and Fh deﬁne whether







an increase on α tends to make the entry constraint more relevant, following the
basic intuition that this constraint matters more when privatization revenues are
relatively more relevant for the objective function of the regulator. The problem is
that this is not the single eﬀect of α. There is also an indirect eﬀect of α through
Fh, reducing the impact of this variable in (17), and making the impact of the
ﬁxed costs coming from the welfare function relatively less important. That is
why the eﬀect of α on the redundancy of the entry constraint is ambiguous. When
c is lower and n is larger, positive variations of α tend to make the entry constraint
more important since this increases the expected privatization revenues.
This model shows the intuition that the greater the concern of the regulator
towards privatization revenues, the optimal number of players for the regulator is
reduced. In this particular model, when the preference of the regulator is such
that it valuates privatization revenues enough, in the sense that α ≥ 1/3, it is
interested in a monopoly ex-post. It does not mean that increases (or decreases)
on α always make the regulator relatively more interested in reducing (increasing)
30Considering that m is an integer, there is a range where this diﬀerence is negative, but m∗
still equals mf .
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the number of players ex-post. It depends on the relative magnitudes of Fh and
c as addressed above. Furthermore, even if α ≥ 1/3, it does not mean that the
constraint is not redundant. This occurs since mf given in (17) can be equal to
1, making the imposition of an external constraint completely redundant in the
model. Market equilibrium will naturally result in a monopoly.
5. Lessons from the International Experience and Conclusions
In the British experience, the great part of the duopoly policy ended at the
beginning of the 90’s. However, the duopoly policy remained in international calls
to sustain the bargaining power of the UK companies relative to their foreign
counterparts (most of them local monopolies) with whom they had to negotiate
interconnection payments. The duopoly policy for the international operation
was ended in June 1996 and, according to Armstrong (1998:69), nearly 50 license
applications were submitted, which is a measure of the “repressed supply” at the
time of market liberalization.31
According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991:239), the duopoly policy in the UK
was usually justiﬁed on grounds of a version of the “infant industry” argument
where the already operating Mercury should be protected while it was establishing
itself in the market. There is an important logical problem with this argument.
Armstrong (2000:4) points out that, if the second entrant makes the ﬁrst entrant
unproﬁtable, it is likely that the former may be more eﬃcient and thus more
preferable to be in the market than the latter. The authors also stress that the
main protection that the UK government should have provided to Mercury would
be against the anticompetitive practices of the BT, mainly in terms of the inter-
connection rules. Furthermore, the authors emphasize that a more eﬃcient aid
should be targeted directly to the entrant. If aid is not focused, as in the impo-
sition of entry constraints, it is possible that more beneﬁt will accrue to BT than
to Mercury given the relative sizes of the two ﬁrms, disguising the objective of the
policy.
Finally, Armstrong et al. (1994) conclude that the duopoly policy, even on a
temporary basis, was shown not to be a good idea in the UK, since it became harder
to overcome BT’s ﬁrst mover advantage: “In important respects, however, it was a
decade of lost opportunities. The deliberate restrictions on competition contained
in the duopoly policy, together with insuﬃcient attention paid to overcoming BT’s
incumbency advantages, acted to preserve the essentially monopolistic character
31The duopoly policy in the UK lasted for 6 years (1984/1990) after privatization, against 3
years and a half in Brazil (1998/2001).
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of the old system in the core area of network operation. Neither did the duopoly
policy enhance the prospects for competition in the longer term”.
Newbery (2000:330) considers that even the argument of privatization revenues
should not be taken so far, since the negotiations in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) are pointing for the removal of entry constraints which would aﬀect the
prospects of future monopoly proﬁts of the company buyers and that; the funds
generated by a small increase in the value added tax VAT would be more eﬃcient.
The author attributes the choice of the UK government for a duopoly policy to the
lack of parliamentary consensus about privatization, requiring that it be privatized
quickly.
The empirical results of the policy of restricting entry in the UK and US point
in the same direction. In the UK, Newbery (2000:323-324) shows that private
ownership did not impact the sector’s productivity in the six years after privatiza-
tion, taking the experiences of other countries as parameters. After lifting entry
constraints, productivity growth accelerated, suggesting that “it is competition
that leads to an acceleration of productivity growth, not privatization”. In the US,
the empirical evidence studied by Mathios and Rogers (1989) shows that, in states
where entry was restricted, average prices increased much more than in the states
where there was a free-entry policy.
This suggests that a free-entry policy generates dynamic eﬃciencies that can-
not be disregarded as in the case of the model developed above. In balance, these
eﬃciencies may even outweigh the static eﬃciency loss due to wasteful duplication
of facilities. In this regard, we ﬁrmly believe that the most relevant variable con-
sidered by the Brazilian regulators in following the same duopoly policy from the
UK was, indeed, privatization revenues. The costs for long-run competition and
eﬃciency are still to be seen.
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